DDASaccident480 by Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
2-2-2005
DDASaccident480
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident480" (2005). Global CWD Repository. 679.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/679
DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/01/2008 Accident number: 480 
Accident time: 11:30 Accident Date: 02/02/2005 
Where it occurred: Na Pang Village, 
Boualapha District, 
Khammouane 
Province 
Country: Laos 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Demolition accident Date of main report: 15/02/2005 
ID original source: None Name of source: GHAD 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Ordnance (Large) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created: 17/01/2008 Date  last modified: 17/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: E 105 42' 526" Map north: N 17 22' 362" 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
incomplete detonation (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
 
Accident report 
The report of this accident was made available in abbreviated form during 2007. Requests 
have been made to the UNDP Country office for the missing detail. The substance of the 
abbreviated report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. Text in [ ] is editorial. 
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 Report of the Investigation Committee 
Ref: [Demining group] Date: 18  February  2005 
Na Pang Village, Boualapha District, Khammouane Province on 2/2/2005 
Sub: Results of the investigation conducted on the accident caused by Mk 82-500 lbs. 
  
Reference: 
a) Agreement of  NPD [Demining group] on the establishment of investigation team to 
investigate  the accident in Khammouane Province on 2/2/2005. 
b) Regulation on [Demining group] activities. 
c) Compliance to the standard operating procedures (SOP), and 
d) Report from the provincial coordinator number 056/UXOKM. 
 
1. Foreword: 
1.1  This report presents the results from the meeting of investigation committee as in 
reference a. The report also provides the summary of situations step by step, explaining all 
the facts and provide recommendations where appropriate. 
1.2  Following headings will be explained in the report: 
• Background of the accident 
• Treatment and evacuation of the victim 
• Rules and procedures 
• Comments on the causes 
• Recommendations 
 
1.3  Documents attached here with are information of witnesses, photographs used to help 
conceptualized the situation. Fragments to be used as evidence from the accident site 
included bomb scrap and fragments of fuze. They have been kept in the UXO Training Centre 
for teaching and learning purposes.  
1.4  Staff who injured and died from this accident has received medical assistance from 
Khammouane Provincial Hospital, Nakhonpanom and Ubon Hospitals in Thailand. 
• Mr. DouangChai got burn on his head, face, body, arms and legs. There were also 
some fragments in his upper right arm and stomach. 
2. Background to the accident 
2.1  Explanation of the situation on 2/2/2005 
2.2  The roving team of Boualapha district, Khammouane province worked within the Napang 
village area. The village code is 1206018 and the GPS of Boualapha district is N 17 22’ 362”; 
E 105 42’ 526”. 
The team comprised of: 
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 Lao SEOD [Name removed];  Team Leader [Name removed]; Section Leader [Name 
removed]; Deminer [5, including the Victim] [Names removed]); Field Medic [Name removed]; 
Driver [Name removed]. 
They have been supported by: 
Provincial Coordinator (PC) [ two Names removed]; Deputy PC [Name removed]; 
Administrator [Name removed]; Operation Assistant [Name removed]; Field Medic No.2 
[Name removed]. 
2.3  The team was assigned to destroy big bombs (M 117- 750 Lbs and MK 82-500 Lbs):  
Both bombs have fuze M 904 at the nose but not at the bottom. These 2 bombs located about 
400 m from the village where there was a considerable high risk to destroy at site. Then, the 
team decided to move those bombs to destroy at a safe site by [Demining group] vehicle and 
used [Demining group] staff to carry it. 
See Pictures [No pictures were made available.] 
At the beginning those bombs were close to Napang village. In order to avoid damage they 
were moved by the team to a safe and appropriate site in the west of Napang village (the site 
were less dangerous if the bomb was to explode). Some parts of the village have been moved 
and securities were set there. The team used Low Order technique to destroy both bombs 
together in order to avoid severe damages. 
Comments: The Low order technique has been used to destroy bombs successfully in 
Khammouane Province and some other provinces as well. It is the new technique of 
destroying bomb.  
2.4  On Wednesday 2/2/2005 at 8:40 am The Team had moved the bomb to the demolition 
site, which was a small cave and had some stone mount as a barrier in its North and West. 
The team then moved the M117 -750 Lbs and MK 82-500 Lbs to close to the stone mount, 
and had a space of about 10 meters. After safety confirmation of all security points, the 
demolition started at 9.25 am. One minute later the team observed the sky to see the smoke 
from the burning bombs and waited for 5 more minutes.  
2.5   [Name removed], the team leader, guided the team to stay at the farm and behind the 
big tree to observe the bomb and they noticed that there were smoke coming out from both 
the bombs. Then the team leader informed all security points to stay until further order 
received. The team waited about 40 minutes and heard the second explosion after the first 
one at the beginning of demolition. Every security point heard the explosion sound well and 
they understood that it was the sound of booster but could not identify if it was the booster of 
both bomb. The team continued to wait for about 1.30 hour before they decided to go closer 
to those bombs in order to see if the burning had already stopped or not. They continued to 
step closer about 50-60 meters away from those bombs to see and found that the burning 
had stopped and no smoke. Then they continued to step closer to about 10 meters and could 
see clearly that the M 117- 750 Lbs cracked and the all explosive inside had spilt out, only the 
booster at the bomb head was left. The MK82- 500 Lbs, it  was also cracked except the head 
part which there was about 80 cm left and got burn all around that area. When the team 
affirmed, they called the team leader to come and check again.   
Comments: The discussion was made in the leader group (Team leader & SEOD) about 
the 750 Lbs  which still had the booster  and decided it could be destroyed before 
lunch. The 500 Lbs  seems to be burned out as they thought that the booster exploded 
when they heard the sound during waiting. Then they called  [Name removed], Section 
commander to come and have a look as well as for instruction purpose and he will be 
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the one who will destroy the booster.  [Name removed], team leader, who has 
considerable experience in demolition wanted to give the opportunity for the section 
commander to practice. Then He went to the security points for safety check. When the 
section commander arrived at the bombs area, the SEOD explained how those bombs 
explode. Then the section commander would connect the detonator and placing C4 in 
order to explode the booster of 750 Lbs  as seen in the following picture: 
See picture [No pictures provided] 
2.6  The team will continue to destroy the bomb and they ordered [the Victim], deminer at the 
safety point (Pressing point) to bring equipments including C4 and electronic detonator to the 
SEOD and Section commander to destroy the booster of 750 Lbs . When [the Victim] reached 
the site and handed over the C4, the section commander ordered him to stay at the safety 
point. The SEOD and the section leader continued their tasks; the SEOD was explaining how 
to connect the detonator and preparing the C4. While they placing the C4 on the fuze of the 
750 Lbs, they heard the explosion and thought that it was the C4 exploded at hand of the 
section commander. However, when they looked back they saw [the Victim] who brought the 
C4 ran out from the place where the sound was. His body was black and he yelled: help  help 
!! the space between 2 bombs was only 7 meters.  
See Pictures [No pictures were made available.] 
Comments: the MK82  believed that it was exploded and burned out after hearing the 
explosion sound second time which may be only the Adapter-booster of both bombs 
that had been detonated at the same time and can not identify. In this case the 500 Lbs  
still has booster that was not exploded, when getting burn before and heating 
continue, then it  exploded. Fuze M904 has been produced in different forms. Some 
form requires direct attach and some are set to be slow explosion (time delay) that can 
be exploded between 1 and 2 second. In this case, it could be the igniter and the time 
control fuze working that led to the explosion.  
It is suspected that: While  [the Victim] returning to the safety point, he walked in to see 
the bottom part of the bomb. When it exploded, smoke, fragments and burning frame 
of the explosive discharged from the bottom of the bomb directly hit him and caused 
injury.  [Name removed], SEOD and [Name removed], section commander were not 
injured at all because they stood at the lower area and that area has some stone 
protection.  
2.7  The following photograph shows the position of the bomb and that of each person. All of 
them were close to the explosion area which they could see each other from a distance. 
See picture [No pictures were made available.] 
2.8  When they saw [the Victim]  he was running out from the explosion area and yelled for 
help,  [Name removed] ran to help him immediately and told him that he will be fine because 
he only got burned. Then he called for help from the field medic and the team. The team 
members at the beginning thought that the accident happened to  [Name removed] and  
[Name removed], but contrary it had happened to [the Victim] who got burned all over his 
face, hair, clothes and all the front side of his body became black. [Name removed]controlled 
the situation calmly and the field medic started the first aid kit urgently. The field medic check 
the symptom of the injured person and move him to place ready to send to hospital. The team 
used the radio to contact the office of PC and related authorities to be prepare for helping the 
patient. Then they sent the patient carefully and in the most appropriate speed to the 
Boualapha District Hospital, which took about 17 minutes.  
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2.9  Summary of situation: 
Date 02/02/2005  
8.40  Divided security points and prepare explosive C4 
9.25  Started to detonate 2 bombs at the same time 
10.05 Heard the first explosion sound 
10.54  Moved closer to the explosion area to observe & see clearly 
11.30  The accident happened 
11.35 PC was informed 
11.40 NPD was informed 
11.58 Moved patient out of the field 
12.15 Patient arrived at the Boualapha District Hospital 
12.40 Transferred patient to Provincial Hospital 
15.15 Transferred patient to the Emergency room of Provincial Hospital 
17.40 Transferred patient to Nakonephanom Hospital in Thailand after that he was 
transferred to Ubon Hospital in the same day. 
 
3. Treatment & Evacuation of the victim 
3.1  In [Demining group] demining and other activities are not allowed to operate without 
being equipped with field medic, radio connection and vehicle to transfer patient when 
accident occurred. This is very important for [Demining group]. The field medics provide only 
the first aid kit then transfers the injurer to the hospital.  
3,2  Boualapha Hospital did not have the doctor on that day and did not have equipments to 
treat patient injured from severe burn. The nurses in the hospital tried their best to help but 
due to the limitation of proper equipments and resources they could not do much. They 
injected some medicines namely, Nikatamit and Hidrokoktisone; closed the patient’s eyes and 
advised to transfer to Provincial Hospital urgently. 
3.3  The coordination in terms of providing medical material is very important during the 
transferring of patient in a long distance and those medical substances such as an IV, pain 
resistance and so on should be planned for spare in order to assist the patient when there is 
an urgent require.  
3.4  [Demining group] staff is familiar with the medical SOP and have seen a lot of accident 
report. This knowledge coupled with their skills and professionalism had helped them to be 
able to provide good assistance to the patient; even though this is the first real UXO accident 
that they have experienced. 
4.  Accident reporting rules and procedures 
4.1   According to the SOP, initially the accident investigation committee has to check the 
accident sites and collect all relevant evidences and then summary the incident and report 
back to [Demining group] Vientiane. The Head quarter, assisted by technical advisor, will then 
check if those involved in the accident had followed the SOP. This accident has been the 3rd 
case occurred internally within [Demining group] operation, which needed to be explained, 
and provinces also need to be informed. 
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5.  Comments on the causes of accident 
5.1  SOP has not strictly been followed 
5.2  Other causes led to the accident: 
• The demolition of 2 big bombs at the same time using Low Order technique have not 
been taught in the [Demining group] SEOD curriculum as it is very difficult to examine 
the bomb after explosion and can not identify which bomb exploded first or exploded 
at the same or not explode yet.  
• The estimation of safety notice from the SEOD and Team Leader was not clear 
enough because the bomb still posing a danger as there were fuzes and explosive 
C4 spread around the bomb and on the bomb.  
• SEOD and Team Leader did not observe thoroughly that the booster of 500 Lbs had 
exploded or not, because if not, then when the bomb was burned and there were 
some heat left, the booster could explode anytime.  
• Final identification of the danger and seeking for advice were done too late.  
• They admitted that the bomb explosion area was still in danger but still, they used 3 
staff to go into that area.  
• Lacking of clear and appropriate waiting time by the SEOD; time spent for waiting 
was too short. 
• The supervisor on connecting detonator and placing explosive C4 did not follow 
safety procedures.  
 
6.  Recommendations 
6.1  The staff used and time spent at the demolition site must be as minimal as possible.  
6.2  Prior to the demolition of bomb (connecting detonator and placing explosive) according to 
the rules and procedures the supervisor must stay far from the person who is connecting 
detonator and placing explosive.  
6.3  When there is a safety site for demolition, high order technique should be used as it is 
safer.  
6.4  Two big bombs should not be destroyed at the same time using low order technique, as it 
cannot guarantee that both bombs were exploded or one exploded one still burning. The risk 
is too high. 
6.5  Every time after explosion, 100% recheck must be taken before moving on to the next 
step.  
6.6  The waiting time should not be less than 2 hours when unsure if the bomb is safe or not.   
6.7  Urgency should not be the case. When there is not enough time, continue on the next 
day. 
6.8  Explosive must be prepared at the safety point before entering the explosion area. 
Deminers should not be used.  
6.9  All [Demining group] team leaders and advisors must be informed about this accident in 
detail.  
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6.10  The recommendations are from the carefully review in different point of view so that we 
can learn from this accident. This will then lead to the improvement in the safety issue of the 
programme, therefore, the recommendations need to be shared.  
6.11  Team Leaders, Lao SEODs and technical advisors must be informed about this 
accident in detail. 
6.12  Technical advisors and technicians and team leader must confirm their understanding 
and agreement on the recommendations and follow it and it becomes a joint responsibility. 
6.13  Team must be educated in order to ensure the safety rules and follow it seriously. 
6.14  The refreshment course on the basic knowledge on bombs must be organized for all 
levels.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
This report presents the results from the investigation on the accident that occurred with the 
bomb demolition team of [Demining group] Khammouane as well as, it provides some 
recommendations for the National Programme Director for consideration and guidance.  
[Demining group] Vientiane, date 18/2/2005 
 
Investigation Committee: 
1. [Name removed] SEODT at Head quarter 
2. [Name removed] STA Belgium at [Demining group] CHS 
3. [Name removed] Team Leader [Demining group] KM 
Attachments: [No attachments were made available.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 640 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 45 minutes 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
severe Arms 
severe Body 
severe Face 
severe Head 
severe Legs 
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COMMENT: See Medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal Medical report was made available. 
The Victim “got burn on his head, face, body, arms and legs. There were also some 
fragments in his upper right arm and stomach….got burned all over his face, hair, clothes and 
all the front side of his body became black.” 
“Boualapha Hospital did not have the doctor on that day and did not have equipments to treat 
patient injured from severe burn. The nurses in the hospital tried their best to help but due to 
the limitation of proper equipments and resources they could not do much. They injected 
some medicines namely, Nikatamit and Hidrokoktisone; closed the patient’s eyes and advised 
to transfer to Provincial Hospital urgently.” 
 
Analysis 
The primary case of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because the investigation 
determined that the individuals involved did not know that they should not have carried out 
two low-order destructions in close proximity. The secondary cause is listed as a 
“Management control inadequacy” because the management should have ensured that 
appropriate training was in place. The failing may have been the responsibility of their ex-
patriot advisors. The group “have not been taught in the [Demining group] SEOD curriculum” 
how two destroy two bombs in close proximity using low-order techniques. It this case, one 
booster detonated and it seems to have been presumed that both detonated at precisely the 
same time – which is very unlikely. 
The Victim had been told to bring explosives very close to the bomb that was erroneously 
believed to have burned out, and only seven metres from the second bomb. This was clearly 
not a safe place to prepare charges. This (and many other failings) was identified by the 
investigators in a thorough and detailed report. It is unfortunate that the photographs, 
annexes and detailed medical report were not made available. 
The “Inadequate medical provision” listed under “Notes” refers to the fact that a CASEVAC 
route to an adequately equipped hospital was not known in advance. 
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